EMPOWERING SMALL FISHERMEN THROUGH SIMULTANEOUS AND SEQUENTIAL MARKETING STRATEGIES

Abstract

One of the socio-economic issues often discussed in marketing of marine catch of smallscale fshermen is the agent-principal relationship. They become socially obliged to the benefts and assistance provided by credit agents specifcally when their credits accumulated. This asymmetric circumstance has empowered the credit agent to gain control over the marketing of fshermen daily catches. Another form of marketing strategy that has never been investigated before, at least in the fshing industry, is the way by which fshermen catches are brought to the market place. Specifcally, we posit those who are dominant in the market will be affected by either simultaneous (collusive and non-collusive) or sequential marketing strategies. Drawing on strategic game theory using data from fsheries statistics, this study is aimed at identifying policies for the least advantaged small fshermen to improve their income and thus their livelihood. Effcient outcomes which are the net incomes derived from fshing activities of small versus medium, medium versus large and small versus large vessel fshermen were used in the analysis of marketing strategies. Evidently, whilst merging is proftable to the small fshermen, sequential with small fshermen as the frst mover is also proftable but has more profound impact on the society’s welfare.